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The publication and subsequent popularity of Harry Frankfurt’s latest book has inserted a 
rather conspicuous and somewhat comical point of discontinuity in the philosophy sections of 
many bookstores. For here we have a small, unassuming book with ‘Bullshit’ printed on the 
outside but lacking the quality of bullshit on the inside. The exact opposite, one cannot fail to 
notice, is true of so many other books sold under the heading of ‘philosophy’ today. Books 
like Chakra Balancing Kit: A Guide To Healing And Awakening Your Energy Body or The 
Hidden Messages In Water Crystals or Numerology Helps You To Master Your Relationship 
And To Find The Right Career or Astrology: A Cosmic Science appear in the same bestseller 
lists and sometimes even on the same bookshelf as On Bullshit – almost as if they are put 
there on purpose to illustrate the unusual topic of Frankfurt’s philosophical study and his 
claim that bullshit is indeed ‘the most salient feature of our culture.’1  
 
When Frankfurt’s analysis of bullshit was first published as an essay in 1986, no one could 
have predicted the philosophical sensation (and hilarious situation) it would cause in 21
st
 
century bookstores. The original essay was received in much the same way as most academic 
articles are received, i.e. without attention from press or public. The essay did, however, 
provoke discussion among fellow philosophers and one admiring but critical response is 
especially worth mentioning since it puts some of Frankfurt’s claims in a new perspective.  
 
In ‘Deeper into Bullshit’ G.A. Cohen gives credit to Frankfurt’s ‘pioneering and brilliant 
discussion of a widespread but largely unexamined cultural phenomenon,’ but he also raises 
some doubts about the scope of Frankfurt’s account.2 Frankfurt’s definition, says Cohen, does 
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not cover all domains of bullshit. On the contrary, ‘the explicandum that attracted his interest 
is just one flower in the lush garden of bullshit.’3 So, ‘On Bullshit’ is really only about one 
kind of bullshit. Other flowers in the ‘lush garden of bullshit’ remain unexamined and 
Cohen’s principal aim in ‘Deeper into Bullshit’ is to identify and define a very specific kind 
of stercore tauri, to be found in academic circles, but altogether ignored by Frankfurt.  
 
In this paper, we shall endeavour to develop and expand Cohen’s critique. We will show that 
there is yet another kind of bullshit not dealt with by Frankfurt or, for that matter, by Cohen. 
Furthermore, we point out the evaluative complexity of bullshit. Frankfurt and Cohen both 
stress its negative and possibly destructive aspects, but one might wonder whether bullshit 
need always and necessarily be reprehensible. We will argue that there are positive or at least 
neutral aspects to some kinds of bullshit. 
 
 
I. Harry Frankfurt on Bullshit 
 
People who produce, package, or sell bullshit, says Frankfurt, are in some way comparable to 
slovenly craftsmen. They are not really paying attention to the quality of their product. There 
is some kind of laxity in their work, though this laxity cannot be equated with inattention to 
detail or carelessness in general. What is lacking in the prime examples of bullshit, to be 
found in ‘the realms of advertising and of public relations, and the nowadays closely related 
realm of politics’,4 is not concern for detail – political spin doctors, for instance, often 
dedicate themselves tirelessly to keeping every tiny thing under control – but concern for the 
truth. According to Frankfurt, the essence of bullshit lies in a ‘lack of connection to a concern 
with truth – [an] indifference to how things really are.’5 To be sure, advertisements and 
political speeches may contain true statements but they will nevertheless strike us as bullshit 
as soon as we realize that the person who produces these statements could not care less 
whether his statements are true or not, as long as they have the desired effect. As such, it is a 
feature of the bullshitter’s state of mind, namely his indifference to truth, that is crucial to the 
production of bullshit.  
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This is not the whole story, however. While an indifference to truth is an essential ingredient 
of bullshit, it is not the only ingredient according to Frankfurt. The case of so-called ‘bull 
sessions’ illustrates this. In a bull session, Frankfurt explains, people try out thoughts and 
attitudes about various aspects of life (relationships, religion, etc.) in order to discover how 
others respond and how it feels to hear themselves saying such things, without it being 
assumed that they are committed to what they say.
6
 These discussions may be very animated 
and significant, but they are typically not ‘for real’. Thus, bull sessions are ‘like bullshit by 
virtue of the fact that they are in some degree unconstrained by a concern with truth.’7 But 
they are not bullshit. Frankfurt is very explicit about this: ‘The statements made in a bull 
session differ from bullshit in that there is no pretence that this connection [between what 
people say and what they believe] is being sustained.’8 Bullshit, by contrast, always involves 
a particular form of pretence or deceit. This is the second essential ingredient of bullshit. 
 
Does this mean that the bullshitter is a liar? Not necessarily. Admittedly, both the liar and the 
bullshitter try to deceive people through misrepresentation but Frankfurt points out that there 
is a significant difference. The liar essentially misrepresents the state of affairs to which he 
refers or his beliefs concerning that state of affairs. The bullshitter, on the other hand, may not 
deceive people, or even intend to do so, about either the facts or what he takes the facts to be. 
What he says may very well be true. So, unlike lying, bullshit is not a matter of falsity. It is 
rather a matter of fakery or phoniness. The bullshitter essentially deceives people about his 
enterprise. His audience is not to understand that he is utterly disinterested with how things 
really are and that his intention is not to report the truth. Frankfurt’s example of a Fourth of 
July orator, who bombastically prates about the achievements and divine blessings of his 
country, serves as a good illustration. ‘He is not trying to deceive anyone concerning 
American history. What he cares about is what people think of him. He wants them to think of 
him as a patriot.’9 So, what the orator misrepresents, is not a particular state of affairs but 
rather his particular state of mind. The truth-value of his statements is of but marginal interest 
to him; winning votes is his prime concern. However, he cannot and does not admit this 
openly. Frankfurt calls this tendency to misrepresent what one is up to an ‘indispensably 
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distinctive characteristic’10 of the bullshitter, making it as central to the concept of bullshit as 
the tendency for indifference as to how things really are.  
 
In order to tell a lie, says Frankfurt, one needs to know how things really are or one must at 
least think that one knows what is true. It is clear by now that this does not hold for bullshit. 
The bullshitter does not have to keep his eye on the facts, whereas the liar must do precisely 
that in order to conceal the facts. That is why, according to Frankfurt, lying does not render a 
person unfit for telling the truth in the same way that bullshitting does. The biggest problem 
with bullshit, so to speak, is not that the bullshitter hides the truth, but rather that he does not 
even remember where he put it. Hence, Frankfurt’s striking conclusion that ‘bullshit is a 
greater enemy of the truth than lies are’11 and his appeal to oppose bullshit wherever it may 
lie in defence of a civilization built upon a concern for truth. 
 
To sum up, in Frankfurt’s analysis, the bullshitter is (i) unconcerned about the truth but also 
(ii) concerned about hiding this fact and thus (iii) morally reprehensible. In what follows, we 
will challenge all three aspects of this view, beginning with (ii) and (iii).  
 
 
II. A Different Take on Bullshit  
 
In the first part of his book, Frankfurt describes a rather intriguing conversation to illustrate 
his account of bullshit. Fania Pascal, Wittgenstein’s Russian teacher, received a call from 
Wittgenstein when her tonsils had just been taken out. Pascal relates: ‘I croaked: “I feel just 
like a dog that has been run over.” He was disgusted: “You don’t know what a dog that has 
been run over feels like.”’12 Frankfurt explains Wittgenstein’s strong reaction to Pascal’s 
innocent remark as follows: ‘To the Wittgenstein in Pascal’s story, judging from his response, 
this is just bullshit.’13 
 
Given Frankfurt’s own account of bullshit, this diagnosis seems problematic. For one of the 
essential ingredients of bullshit is clearly missing. Fania Pascal is not hiding something or 
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deceiving someone and there seems to be no fakery or phoniness involved. So why should her 
statement be interpreted as bullshit?  
 
Frankfurt might reply that it should, in fact, not be interpreted as bullshit and that it is only 
Wittgenstein who thinks that Pascal is talking bullshit. Frankfurt seems to take this stance 
when he says: ‘It seems extraordinary, almost unbelievable, that anyone could object 
seriously to what Pascal reports herself as having said’14 and ‘Wittgenstein’s reaction … is 
absurdly intolerant.’15 So, Frankfurt himself seems unconvinced that Pascal’s utterance is 
bullshit. But Wittgenstein thinks it is – that is the point. Should we assume then that 
Wittgenstein thinks that Pascal is deceiving people about her enterprise or hiding something? 
If we hold on to Frankfurt’s analysis of bullshit, we should. But this assumption is plainly 
false. Wittgenstein’s objection does not amount to an accusation of either fakery or phoniness. 
That is not what bothers him. Another explanation is needed and Frankfurt’s account may 
need some adjustment.  
 
Fania Pascal is not concerned with how things really are, that much seems certain. She 
obviously does not know, except in the most vague sense, how a run-over dog feels. 
Nevertheless, she employs the image to describe her own state of mind. This mindlessness is 
what bothers Wittgenstein. He finds her indifference to the truth obnoxious and clearly sees 
this as sufficient ground for discarding her remark as plain bullshit. Wittgenstein, we know 
from various sources, was extremely demanding when the truth was concerned. In 
philosophical discussions, but also in daily life, one should never trifle with the facts, he 
thought. One should always try to get things right. This notorious exactingness probably 
explains why Wittgenstein almost never engaged in playful ‘bull sessions’ or chitchat, not 
even when this was part of a language class (Fania Pascal recalls how hard it was to find a 
suitable subject for a conversation with Wittgenstein: ‘The conversation lessons were 
excruciating. We sat in the garden. With the utmost impatience he rejected any topic I would 
suggest ... To him they were all absurd, non-topics.’16) It also explains why he was so 
‘disgusted’ with Pascal’s remark on the phone. Pascal was playing fast and loose with the 
facts and did not even make an attempt to get things right. Wittgenstein found this intolerable.  
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There is something slightly absurd about this intolerance, as Frankfurt rightly points out. Most 
of us would not disapprove of, let alone express disgust at a loose remark like Pascal’s. It is 
easy to understand why. Most of us do not share Wittgenstein’s exacting standards. We do not 
always expect people to be as accurate and precise as humanly possible. Sure, Pascal is 
‘cutting corners’ like a slovenly craftsman, but who doesn’t once in a while? Besides, the 
purpose of conversation is not always to give an accurate description of reality. People 
sometimes say things just to be funny, agreeable or sociable. In many conversations, it is not 
so important what one is saying, but rather that one is saying something and talking to 
someone. It is about making the other feel comfortable, for instance, and not about trying to 
get things right. 
 
A certain amount of sloppiness in our speech may be tolerated, but this does not mean it goes 
undetected. Most people, when pressed, would acknowledge that Pascal’s comparison of her 
own feelings to those of a run-over dog, is bullshit. Yet they do not seem to mind as much as 
Wittgenstein. They do not think this sort of bullshit is unforgivable or unreasonable. Being 
intolerant in this respect, that would be unreasonable.  
 
If this diagnosis is correct, Frankfurt’s account has to be revised in at least two ways. 
 
1. Pretence is not an essential ingredient of bullshit. Fania Pascal’s utterance, for instance, 
qualifies as such, though there is no element of deceit or fakery involved. A mere indifference 
to the truth is apparently all that is needed.  
 
Of course, a speaker will often try to conceal his own indifference when he knows that his 
audience is very concerned about how things really are. A politician, for example, who is 
primarily interested in getting re-elected instead of getting things right, has to hide this fact. 
The bullshit he sells, will usually be accompanied by pretence and deceit. However, this 
combination is not inevitable. Just imagine a politician who is fed up with all the fakery and 
phoniness and starts talking bullshit openly, without hiding his complete indifference to the 
truth. The audience will probably feel shocked and the outcry, ‘Bullshit!’ will be heard 
everywhere. Yet, in contrast with the 4
th
 of July orator mentioned by Frankfurt, this speaker is 
not hiding what he is up to. Thus, in Frankfurt’s view, his speech cannot count as bullshit. 
This is a very counterintuitive conclusion. 
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Frankfurt’s distinction between bullshit and bull sessions is just as counterintuitive. For 
suppose one would ask the participants in a playful bull session what they were doing. A 
natural response would be: ‘We are just talking bullshit.’ Likewise, people witnessing a bull 
session will readily acknowledge that bull sessions consist mainly of bullshit. Frankfurt 
ignores this and claims there is a fundamental difference between bullshit and bull sessions. 
This distinction, centred around the presence or absence of pretence, is inevitably artificial. 
After all, the very term ‘bull session’ is most likely an abbreviation or sanitized version of 
‘bullshit session.’17  
 
2. Bullshit is not always a bad thing. Although the term is typically used to express 
indignation, irritation or disapproval, bullshit is not always offensive. Frankfurt finds this 
particularly hard to understand. He is genuinely puzzled by the fact that ‘our attitude toward 
bullshit is generally more benign than our attitude toward lying’ and leaves it ‘as an exercise 
for the reader’ to find out why this is so.18 Perhaps the answer is not so difficult. Why is our 
attitude towards bullshit, resulting from a manifest indifference to the truth, so benign in 
many circumstances? Because in many circumstances the concern for truth and accuracy is 
not (and should not be) our primary concern. For instance, it is not our main concern, and 
rightly so, when someone is in terrible pain and in need of a comforting conversation. 
Wittgenstein’s failure to appreciate this makes him, in Frankfurt’s own words, ‘absurdly 
intolerant’.  
 
A bit of bullshit from time to time might even be a good thing. That is what the old butler 
Stevens in Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day comes to realize when he is reflecting on 
the practice of ‘bantering’, or as contemporary Americans would call it, ‘bullshitting’:  
 
‘There is a group of six or seven people gathered just a little way behind me who have aroused my 
curiosity a little. I naturally assumed at first that they were a group of friends out together for the 
evening. But as I listened to their exchanges, it became apparent they were strangers who had just 
happened upon one another here on this spot behind me. … It is curious how people can build such 
warmth among themselves so swiftly. … I rather fancy it has [something] to do with this skill of 
bantering. Listening to them now, I can hear them exchanging one bantering remark after another. It is, 
I would suppose, the way many people like to proceed. In fact, it is possible my bench companion 
expected me to banter with him – in which case, I suppose I was something of a sorry disappointment. 
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Perhaps it is indeed time I began to look at this whole matter of bantering more enthusiastically. After 
all, when one thinks about it, it is not such a foolish thing to indulge in – particularly if it is the case that 
in bantering lies the key to human warmth.’19  
 
Indeed, we should perhaps look at the whole matter of bullshitting more enthusiastically than 
Frankfurt does. As a means to lay contact with others or keep the conversation going, it can 
be a source of human warmth and a blessing rather than a curse. Hence, we are not so sure 
that the world would be a better place without it. Just imagine that every conversation were to 
be informed by a strong concern for the truth. Conversations would be terribly fatiguing. For 
as Oscar Wilde once said: ‘The truth is rarely pure, and never simple.’ This is probably one of 
the reasons why Wilde himself was not too concerned about truth and accuracy in 
conversation. And we may be thankful for that. The world would certainly be a duller place 





In ‘Concealment and Exposure’ Thomas Nagel discusses another case of ‘benign bullshit’: ‘If 
I say, ‘How nice to see you,’ you know perfectly well that this is not meant as a report of my 
true feelings: Even if it happens to be true, I might very well say it even if you were the last 
person I wanted to see at just that moment.’21 Despite an obvious lack of concern for the truth, 
Nagel breaks a lance for polite formulae like this. ‘The first and most obvious thing to note … 
is that they are not dishonest, because the conventions that govern them are generally known. 
If I don’t tell you everything I think and feel about you, that is not a case of deception, since 
you don’t expect me to do so.’22 Furthermore, polite formulae are a sine qua non of a stable 
society as they leave a great range of potentially disruptive material unacknowledged and 
therefore out of play. Nagel certainly seems to have a point. Polite bullshit is often to be 
preferred to truthful expressions of hostility, contempt, derision, sexual desire or aversion.  
 
What about Frankfurt’s most central claim, however, that the essence of bullshit concerns an 
indifference towards truth?  
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III. A Different Kind of Bullshit 
 
According to Frankfurt, the most distinctive feature of bullshit is one situated in the speaker’s 
state of mind. The bullshitter is indifferent and hides this indifference. However, it would 
appear that an utterance often qualifies as bullshit purely as a result of certain of its objective 
features independent of the speaker’s stance. This suggests that there is another kind of 
bullshit that should be explained not by reference to the state of mind of the producer but 
rather by pointing to certain salient features of the ‘product’ itself.  
 
This is the basic idea of G.A. Cohen’s response to Frankfurt. In his short and lively article, 
‘Deeper into Bullshit’, Cohen starts out by noting that Frankfurt’s definition of the ‘essence’ 
of bullshit does not sit well with the kind of bullshit that concerns him the most, namely the 
bullshit abundant in certain academic circles and best exemplified by the French continental 
tradition. This sort of bullshit cannot be explained by reference to the indifference or 
insincerity of the producer. After all, some of the most hideous examples appear to be the 
result of honest academic efforts. What is missing in these cases is an appropriate connection 
to the truth, but not as far as the state of mind of the producer is concerned, but with respect to 
features of the texts themselves. More specifically, it is the unclarifiable unclarity of those 
philosophical or sociological texts, says Cohen, that constitutes their high bullshit content.  
 
An unclarifiable text is not only obscure but is incapable of being rendered unobscure, at least 
in a text that could be recognised as a version of what was originally said. A helpful trick is 
this: add or subtract a negation sign from a text and see whether that makes any difference to 
its level of plausibility. If not, Cohen says, one may be sure that one is dealing with bullshit. 
Unsurprisingly, he concludes his analysis in the same way as Frankfurt, with a call to oppose 
and expose bullshit whenever possible. Academic discourse should always aim for the truth 
and texts that are so obscure that the question of truth becomes irrelevant, are a threat to any 
serious academic enterprise.   
 
Now that we have a basic distinction between two kinds of bullshit, Frankfurt-bullshit and 
Cohen-bullshit, we can ask the question: does this distinction enable us to classify all the 
‘flowers in the lush garden of bullshit’? In other words, is every instance of bullshit 
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necessarily an instance of Frankfurt-bullshit or Cohen-bullshit? To answer this question, let us 
return to the beginning of this paper.  
 
What about books like Chakra Balancing Kit or The Hidden Messages In Water Crystals or 
Numerology Helps You To Master Your Relationship And To Find The Right Career or 
Astrology: A Cosmic Science? Do we have a convincing account now of the specific kind of 
bullshit to be found in these pseudoscientific works? It does not appear so.  
 
The plethora of pseudoscientific nonsense, though widely recognized as a paradigm of 
bullshit (if you Google astrology and bullshit, for instance, you get 290.000 hits), remains 
surprisingly unharmed by the attacks of Frankfurt and Cohen. Neither provides an appropriate 
explanation for this form of bullshit. Firstly, pseudoscientists typically have a firm and sincere 
belief in their practice and go to great lengths to prove the truth of the doctrines they endorse. 
They are not indifferent to the truth, quite the contrary. Thus, Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit 
does not seem to apply. But Cohen’s definition falls short as well, for the predictions and 
statements of pseudoscientists are often very specific and explicit as opposed to unclear or 
unclarifiable. Just think of astrologers predicting an earthquake or hurricane on a specific date 
or bogus healers providing a detailed diagnosis and assessment of a patient’s condition.  
 
Here is a serious lacuna in the literature on bullshit. Not only is pseudoscientific bullshit very 
prominent and visible, there is also no doubt that the bullshit of pseudoscientists is at least as 
damaging and therefore as deserving of strict scrutiny as the bullshit produced by advertisers 
or academics. After all, how many people are really affected by the philosophical impotence 
targeted by Cohen? And how many people are nowadays really deceived by advertisers? (In 
fact, people often seem to expect ‘good bullshit’ from these professionals rather than 
complete truthfulness…) Pseudoscience, though sometimes an innocent pastime, is known to 
have a large and damaging impact on the lives of many and to pose a threat to the credibility 
of science, medicine and even politics. These effects certainly warrant further investigation 
into the what, how, and why of this third kind of bullshit. 
 
But this is not the right place to carry out this investigation. For one thing, it would 
necessitate a detailed account of the nature of pseudoscience which would go beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, we do want to draw attention to a short, pertinent remark made 
by Cohen. After discussing unclarifiability as the key component of bullshit, he briefly 
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identifies ‘arguments that are grossly deficient either in logic or in sensitivity to empirical 
evidence’ as another possible source of bullshit.23 We would like to suggest that these 
features, insensitivity to evidence and fallacious reasoning, must be central to any analysis of 
pseudoscientific bullshit. Admittedly, this characterization remains rather vague. But as a 
general rule and in order to avoid bullshit, we believe it is better to be vaguely right than 
precisely wrong.  
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